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- (2) The Political Department of the Ministry of National

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Defense insists that the Pao Mi Chu is an independent agency of the Ministry, operating strictly for security purposes and separately from the Political Department.

(3) Ministry of National Defense General Order 108, November 3, 1951, formally abolished the system of political officers' interfering with military commanders. Moreover, in a recent critique, President Chiang pointed out that political officers must not intervene in the military command and that, if any case of such intervention is brought to his attention, he will take appropriate action. This expression of intention by President Chiang to preserve the integrity of the command should be construed as a directive.

(4) At the Ministry of National Defense level, General Chiang issues no orders without their being promulgated by General CHOU Chih-jou, Chief of Staff. Barber said that, while the technical channel for General Chiang possibly to circumvent General Chou still exists, he does not know to what extent it is utilized.

(5) In the higher echelons, political officers rank lower than unit commanders but in the lower echelons (battalion and company level) political officers and commanding officers are customarily of equivalent rank. In the navy, however, political officers tend to rank higher than in the other armed services and they are less likely to be regular naval officers.

Barber remarked that during the past two months when he has been working closely with the Political Department he has encountered no concrete examples of political officers' interference with the military command. At the same time, however, he believes that fear of political officers' influence does exist among military commanders and that those commanders who are least competent are the most apprehensive of the political officers' reporting and other activities. In this regard, he said that in the case of the Chinese Air Force, whose commanding officers generally evoke respect for their ability, there seems to be relatively little concern about political officers.

(General Chase, Chief of MAAG, concurs in the foregoing account.)

* The Pao Mi Chu is a successor to General Tai LI's intelligence organization. The Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Interior, which concerns itself primarily with internal security, is sometimes referred to as the Chinese counterpart of the American F.B.I. It may be remarked that the delineation of functions among the various security and intelligence agencies of the Chinese Government is obscure.

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K. L. Rankin